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Summary  findings
Latin American countries have not had much experience  Trade policy itself can bc used for protection even
with competition policy. Restricted trade policies,  without high tariffs or quantitative restrictions.
together with no competition policy, have oftcn resulted  Antidumping, countervailing,  and safeguard  measures
in domestic monopolies.  limit rather than promote competition. These measures
Trade liberalization  in the 1980s and 1990s has  which should be GilT-compatible  by law and
strengthened imporr competition, but trade policies  competition-promoting in spirit - must be used
alone cannot create a competitive economic  judiciously.  Guasch and Rajapatirana favor the use of
environment. And trade policy  as an instrument of  safeguards  rather than other measures  to provide
competition policy (limited  as it has been) has been  temporary protection for firms facing  import surges.
constrained by a disproportionate amount of nontraded  Latin American countries have recently made
goods, vertical integration, and distribution monopolies  impressive  strides in trade reform, but have made limited
-and  sometimes the use of antidumping,  use of competition policies.  Guasch and Rajapatirana
countervailing, and safeguard measures  argue for more use of competition policies  to enhance
Competition policies.-  such as antitrust laws, merger  gains from trade reform. They also argue for
controls, and other regulatory measures  - can prevent  harmonization of competition  policies as these countries
exclusionary practices, collusion  among competitors, and  reduce barriers against each other through regional
the abuse of markert  power. Allowing  foreign ownership  agreements.
and liberalized investment regimes  will further cnhance  More efforts should be made to:
domestic competition by adding market presence.  a Create favorable competitive  environments.
Guasch and Rajapatirana contend that trade and  - Harmonize trade, regulatory, and competition
competition policies must complement each other and  policies as well as conflict  resolution mechanisms.
that when they do, welfare improves.  Tensions between-  Strengthen enforcement mechanisms  and make them
the two policy areas arise because of globalization,  binding.
regional policies, technical  barriers, certain kinds of
industrial policy, and macroeconomic  exigencies.
This  paper-aproduct  oftheAdvisory  Group,  Latin  Amerncaandthe  Caribbean,TechnicalDcepartment-is  part of  alargereffort
to disseminate  lessons  about policy  and institutional  reform  that are relevant  to the region.  Copies  of the paper are available  free
from thc World Bank,  18  18 H StreetNW,  Washington,  DC  20433. Please  contactJoyTroncoso,  room 18-314,  extension  37826
(29 pagcs).  December  1994.
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The 1980s  and the l990s have  seen impressive  reforms in  -trade  policies,  followed  by
even more  recent attempts  to introduce,  reform, and refine  competition  policies  in Latin
America. The motivation  for the trade reforms  arose from the poor results  of earlier
policies, the findings  of research  on trade and development,  and the experience  of East  Asian
countries  which  demonstrated  the success  that could be had from trade liberalization.?  In
addition,  the large external  shocks  and investment  booms  of the 1970s  and 1980s  exacerbated
the macroeconomic  disequilibrium  further necessitating  adjustment As a part of the World
Bank's adjustment  package  for these  countries  trade reforms  were included  in the structural
adjustment  loans extended  by the Bank. Stabilization  asets  were handled  by the stand-by
facilities  provided  by the International  Monetary  Fund, which also supported  trade and
exchange  rate reforms. Consequently,  the Latin American  and Caribbean  countries  have
become  highly  open trade regimes  (see  Table 1).
As for competition  policies, there was hardly  any effort to introduce  them,  let alone
refine, even  in some  perfunctory  manner, those  in existence. Nearly all the Latin  American
countries  had highly  restricted  trade regimes  with little or no import competition.  Under
these circumstances,  and since  the prevailing  ideology  of inward oriented  policies  implied
state ownership  of many of the activities,  some competition  polices  were needed  to substitute-
for the absence  of import competition.  Where  there was no state  monopoly  thire were
private  monopolies. They were regulated  not so much by competition  policy,  but rather by
price controls,  capacity  licensing,  and the implicit  barriers to entry arising from  import  and
exchange  controls. In this situation  import  restrictions  and the lack of competitive  polices
reinforced each other to lead to non-competitive, moribund, and high cost  domestic
industries.
To be sure, there were earlier episodes of import competition that arose not as a
microeconomic efficiency device, but as a supply management instrumenL These occurred
when countries found themselves  with high reserves due to terms of trade improvements,
good weather that raised export crops, or strong fiscal corrections that led to periods of high
foreign exchange reserves.  In other words, import competition was allowed for limited
periods and more as a result of macroeconomic  policies, rather than as an instrument  to
achieve greater efficiency or growth by actually encouraging competition.
With this background the paper begins by examining the role of trade and competition
policies in the Latin American region, with specific country references as warranted.  The
next section discusses trade, competition, and investment policies with respect to their
conceptual aspects
'The work of Little,  Scitovsky, and Scott (1970); Bhagwati (1978); and Krueger (1978); are outstanding
examples  of research into trade and development  that influenced trade reforms.Table 1: Some Indicators  of Trade Regimes  before and after Reform
Average  unweighted  Tariff  range  Coverage  of QRs  Openness  of
Pre-reform'/  legal tariff rates  legal tariff  weight  on imports  economy
Country  Post-reform  year  pre-reform  post-reform  pre-reform  post-reform  preoreform  post-reform  pre-reform  post-reform
Argentina  1987  1991  %C-  la  I1-L  *-ss  -,  J'ew  3a.O
Bolivia  1985  1991  12'  8  NA  S-10  NA  Minimal  57.5  83.9
Brazil  1987  1992  51  21  0-105  06S  39  Minimal  21.2  25.2
Chile  1984  1991  35  11  35  it  Minimal  0  44.9  56.3
Colombia  1984  1992  61  12  0-220  5-20  99  1  28.2  32.7
Costa Rica  1985  1992  53'  15'  0-1,400'  5-20  NA  0  58.7  79.0
Ecuador  1989  1992  37'  18  0-338  2-254  t00  0  48.7  50.8
Guatemala  1985  1992  50'  15'  5-90  5-20  6  0  31.3  35.6
Honduras  1985  1992.  41'  i5  5-90  5-20  NA  0  62.8  61.8
Jamaica  1981  1991  NA  20  NA  045.  NA  0  10S.S  163.5
Mexico  1985  1990  24 L  13k  0-100  0-20  92b  2 0b  22.6  34.3
Paraguay  1988  1991  NA  16  NA  3-86  NA  Few  51.0  63.1
Peru  1988  1992  NA  17  0-120  5-25  100  0'  30.4  41.6
Trinidad
and Tobago  1989  1991  NA  41'  NA  0-103'  NA  Few  124.9  141.2
Uruguay  1987  1992  32  18  10-55  12-24  0  0  38.0  45.1
Venezuela  1989  1991  37  19  0-135  0-50  40  101  49.3  54.3
a.  Including  tarif surcharges.
b.  Percentage  of domestic  product.
c.  Import  weighted  average  tariff.
d. Ecuador  also has a specific  tariff of 40 percent  on automobiles,
e. Percentage  of domestic  product,  Guatemala  has  sigrificant  QRs for health  and safety reasons;  pre-reform  they covered  29 percent  of domestic  manufarturing  production.
f.  Including  tariff surcharges.
g,  Some  QRs exist for health  and safety reasons.
h. Production  weighted  average.
i.  Agricultural  products  only.
j.  Another  8 percent  of tariff items  are restricted  because  of health  reasons, per-reform  the number  was 5 percent.
Source: World Bank (various  reports,.staff  estimates  and ANDRBX  data).
2and instruments.  The third section  discusses  the complementarity  and the likely tensions
between  trade competition  policies  and investment  regimes  and their limits for achieving
efficiency  and growth.  The fourth section  examines  the implications  of and-dumping
safeguards  and countervailing  measures  with respect to competition  promotion. The fifth
section discusses  issues  relating to the risks and consequences  of anti-dumping,
countervailing,  and safeguard  measures  . The sixth section  discusses  challenges  to the
harmonization  of policies. The final section  provides conclusions.
2.  Trade, Competition, and Foreign Investment  Polcies:  Concepts and Instruments
Trade Policy
Trade policies  are those which are aimed at altering  the relative  price of goods traded
through tariffs, subsidies,  quotas, safeguards,  and anti-dumping  and countervailing  duties.
The essential  feature of all these  measures  when used as instruments  of trade policy is that
they drive wedges between  the foreign  and domestic  price of a good or service  at a given
exchange  rate.
Trade policy per se covers  a wide area. It includes  both the export  and import
regimes as well as the institutional  framnework  in which trade policies  are implemented.
Today, trade policy goes beyond  goods to services, and includes  trade in financial  assets  as
well as exchange rate policies. The lines of demrarcation  betwe  trade and a host of other
policies have become increasingly blurred.  Trade policies have become more related to
investment measures, intellectual property rights,  environmental standards as well as labor
standards.
Export Pronotion  Polices
in  the past these policies had played an important role precisly  because Latin
American countries  were reluctant  to liberalize their import regimes  and to replace  various
exort  promotion  measures  with exchange  rate adjustments. This was the main reason  why
specific  export promotion  measures  were implemented. Erport promotion  policies  lie at the
heart of external competition  in third markets. ConsequentLy,  countries  attempted  to reduce
the bias against  exports caused  by overvalued  exchange  rates, import protection  measures,
and particularly  from import  measures  which effected imported  intermediate  inputs usd  in
the production  of exports. The various export promotion  measures  included  duty drawbacks
and special exchange  rates as well as concessional  credit for exports.
Protection from  Imports
Import protection  was a principal  reason for the development  of domestic  monopolies.
While tariffs raised foreign  prices, it was quantitative  restrictions  (ORs) that bestowed
monopoly  power to many  import  substitution  industries. Within a regime of quantitative
restrictions  competition  was limited, particularly  when import  licenses  were granted  on the
basis of existing,  capacity  and with limited access to foreign  exchange.
3Other measures have had a protectionist character including voluntary export
restrictions (VERs), anti-dumping, safeguards, and countervailing duties.  The first of these
measures attempt to restrict imports by co-opting the exporters under the threat of open
protection. The exporting country is asked to "volunteer" to reduce exports of the item in
question. The VER between the United States and Japan for automobiles is the best known
example of this.
Ant-dumping,  safeguards, and countervailing duties have recognized functions in the
GAIT  rules. But they can, and do, become protectionist devices when their purpose exceeds
what has been stipulated in international law as acceptable codes of conduct to prevent
predatory pricing,  sudden surges in imports that cannot be readily absorbed and as a
measure against government subsidization by the exporting countries.
The relationship between trade policies and competition policies is best seen in the
area of import competition. Trade policies, such as VER, quotas, high and extremely
differentiated tariff rates, anti-dumping duties, and burdensome bureaucratic procedures, tend
to protect domestic import competitors increasing their producer surplus while consumer
suiplus declines with the higher prices and lower outputs.  The improper setting of any of
those instruments as a part of a trade policy framework adversely impacts competition and
efficiency.  Import restrictions not only constitute a barrier to competition, but can also act
as a brake to structural change in developing economies.  As Bhagwati (1965) has noted,
quantity restrictions can have anti-competitive effects.  Krishna (1984) confinrs  the anti-
competitive nature of quotas in oligopolistic markets, whereas Messerlin (1990) has argued
that anti-dumping policy encourages importers and domestic competitors to cooperatively
develop anti-competitive price-raising agreements. 2 Protection may also lead to inefficient
entry.  Competidon from imports improves resource allocadon and use, and prevents the
abuse of marlet power by domestic firms.
Competition  Policy
The term competition policy encompasses the area commonly known as anti-trust or
anti-monopoly law and practice as well as various micro-industrial policies affecting markets.
Competition laws strive to deter and prevent abuses of market power, dominance,
exclusionary practices and the reaching of agreements among competitors.  They aim to
promote and protect competition and economic efficiency, rather than competitors.
Market power is dependent on the relative size and structure of the market (e.g.,
number of competitors, ease of entry, contestability extent, trade barriers, and availability of
present or potential substitutes).  Dominance is based upon the absolute size of the producing
firn,  its links to inputs and other output producing industries, and its influence in and by. the
international market.
Competition policy is executed through the legal system, and works through its proper
and predictable enforcement-deterrence effects.  Competition laws essentially address two
2The  EC market provides the best evidence for this collusion outcome of anti-dumping measures.
4areas: the conduct  of business  and the structure  of economic  markets. Issues of performance
are embedded  directly  or indirectly  in those two areas. In the event of transgressions,
producers  are subject  to criminal  and civil prosecution,  fines, or injunctions.
Conduct  Policies. Competition  policy prohibits  conduct  that either  unfairly  diminishes
trade, reduces  competition,  or abuses  a market-dominating  position. The laws  are
intended  to counter:
Horizontal  restraints:  These are unilateral  or collective  acdons  weakening  or
restraining  competition  among firms in the same market. Examples  of this
are:  price or bid fixing (competitors  explicitly  cooperate  to set pnces, or to
prearrange  auctions  outcomes);  conscious  parallelism  (tacit  agreement  on price
setting;  it may occur in competitive  markets  as well as in oligopolistic  ones, so
it is considered  only a symptom  of non-competitive  behavior);  output
restraints;  market  division  (suppliers  self-allocating  customers  among
themselves);  exclusionary  practices;  exchange  of commercially  sensitive
information;  predation;  or restraints  on entry.
Vertical  restraints:  These are provisions  in contracts  between  suppliers  and
their distributors  (and  retailers). Vertical  restraints  may be used  to support
non-competitive  conduct  by competing  suppliers,  the exercise  of market  power
by distributors,  or the segmentation  of markets  on a geographic  basis  to
practice  geographic  price discrimination. Examples  are:  exclusive  dealing
(suppliers  disallowing  purchase  of competitors'  products);  refusal  to deal;
resale  price mechanism  (supplier  conditions  sale to distributor  on establishing
distributors'  price); territorial  restraint (selling  in limited  region  to support
price discrimination);  price discrimination;  premium  offers, tying;  and full line
forcing  (supplier  requiring  distributor  to carry all supplier's  products).
*  fEforcement  standards:  The existence  of laws is necessary,  but not sufficient,
to achieve  the objectives  of competition  policy. Enforcement  depends  upon
attributes  of the legal system  and the judiciary, as well as the credibility  and
sanctity  to which  the laws are upheld.
Structural  Policies. These  have become  the fastest  growing  means  of pursuing  anti-
trust aims. Competition  laws influence  market  structure  by affecting  intercorporate
transactions  (contractual  or ownership  relationships  among  suppliers  or competiors),
usually  mergers,  takeovers,  joint ventures,  and asset transfers. They  aim to prevent
tansactions that would  reduce  the independence  of competing  suppliers  (vertical
integration)  and increase  concentration  in market (horizontal  integration);
- *  Merger control regulation: Selectively prohibiting mergers that would
substantially  increase  concentration  in the market  or restrain  trade among
suppliers.
S Pre-merger  notificadon:  Allows  authorities  to review  proposed  mergers  prior
to actualization,  thereby  making  merger  control  administration  more  efficient.
*  Enforcement  and remedial  measures  under  merger  control: Since  transactions
involving  multi-product  firms might lead to competitive  concerns  over only a
few products,  remedial  measures  such as divestiture  and de-monopolization
have been  introduced. These remedies  have  been designed  to promote
competition  by brealing up a supplier  into smaller  independent.  units,  tlius
preventing  the negative  increased  concentration  effects  of the.merger..  This
can effectively  replace  regulatory  supervision  of economic  conduct  with market
discipline  in some  contexts.
Performance  Policies
*  - Adminstradve  pricing  by anti-trust  authonty:  The state compensates  for lack
of competition  by dictating  prices or output. Although  available,  these  policies
are rarely used  as they counter the fundamental  premise  that markets  are more
efficient  at determining  prices and outputs.  The standard  policy  is regulation  of
various modes and, usually, is only.  applied to sectors that display significant
natul  monopoly  chaacteristics.
Direct Foreign Investment  and Ownership Restrictions
An important  complement  to trade policy and an element  of the import  competition
framework  is the foreign  investment  and ownership  regime. While import  compeitdon  (free
trade) provides  for market  access,.  foreign  investment  and ownership  provides  for market
presence  (foreign-owned  domestic  production). Both increase  competition. Direct  market
participation  from foreign  entities  can be a powerful  competition  device.  It adds
heterogeneity,  brings newer technologies  and vision, and it limits  domestic  advantages  based
on tansportation and border  related  transaction  costs and non-tradable  factors. Moreover,
direct foreign  investment  allows  the home country  to retain  most of the benefits  of trade
liberalization. Most countries  have  some  restrictions,  global  and sectoral  (banldng,
automobiles  and oil are some  examples),  and other trade related  investment  restricdon
measures  (local  content)  for foreign  participation,  often not for economic  reasons. Clear
legislation,  opening  the domestic  market  to foreign  participation,  recovery  of  foreign
investment,  and the absence  of ownership  restrictions,  are all essential  for an effective
competition  policy. Similar  arguments  apply for the access  of foreign  entities  to domestic
procurement  processes.  An important  corollary  to foreign  direct  investment  and ownership
law are laws relating  to intellectual  property. The legal framework  must  protect  the rights of
inventors,  artists, and patent  holders  and reward innovation  and artistic talent.  In the absence
of such  protection  fewer  goods  and services will be produced  and society  will be the loser.
At the same  time the consumer  must also be protected  to prevent  the emergence  of pe_petual
unchallenged  monopolies  that vitiate  competition  policies.
6The enactment  of effective  intellectual  property legislation  and its proper enforcement
is also key for increased  competitiveness  in domestic markets.  It is essential  to secure
technology  transfers and the licensing  of new technologies  which improve  competitiveness
and efficiency. Its objective  is to facilitate  the development  of technological  infrastructure
and access  to, and transfer  of, foreign  technology  and to foster innovations. Partial evidence
of the need for such legislation  and for its proper enforcement  comes  from a recent survey  of
large US chemical,  pharmaceutical,  and technology  companies.  Over 70% of these firms
stated  that intellectual  property  protection  in most LAC countries  is so weak that they would
not grant companies  in such countries  licenses  for the use of their products or of their most
recent technologies.
As of now, intellectual  property  rights are inconsistently  pmtected  from country  to
country. There is a need to homogenize  and simplify  procedures  for international  protection
of patents, trademarks,  copyrights,  designs,  and trade secrets (treaties  such as the European
Tent Office  and the proposed  badrid Convention  Protocol). Enforcement  should  fall under
the auspices of a supranational body, rather than relying on voluntary, or bilateral means.
As of now, The Uruguay Round  includes  a provision  for Trade Related  Intellectual  Property
Rights (IRIPS).  As with the rest of the Round,  the substantive negotiations and signing have
taken  place but a certain amount  of work is still needed  to tie up the legal issues.
Furthermore, there are transitionial  provisions which give developing countries some
additional time, up to ten years, before they have to meet their obligations.  TRIPS will not
be applicable  until the World Trade Organization  (WTO) is established. The TRIPS
agreement  essentially  requires that each signatory  accord nationals  of other member  states no
less favorable  treatment  than it accords  to its-  nationals. It provides  the type of minimum
protection  already set out in the Paris Convention,  Berne Convention,  and other intellectual
property  agreements. In the longer term, referral of disputes  will be to the WTO, but not
until five years after its establishment.
3.  Trude and Competition Policies: Complementanies  and Tensions
Analytical  Framework
The easiest way  to see the complementarity  between  trade policy and competition
policy is to consider  the traditional  neo-classical  model of trade, with two goods, community
utility  functions,  and welfare maximization  with a fixed aggregative  factor of production.
(See Appendix  figure A.) When there is free trade, and the country in question  has no
monopoly  power in the tradeable  sector, welfare can be maximized  by equating  the domestic
marginal  rates of transformation  in production  with the foreign marginal  rate of
transformation  and exchange,  which  is given by the fixed terms of trade.  When  some  non-
traded goods  are produced they are not subject  to foreign competition. In that case the level
of welfare  achieved  with free trade and no competition  policies  is lower than that which
could be achieved  with competition  policies. That is, competition  policies  allow the
economy's domestic  marginal  rates of substitution  in production  to be equated  with foreign
marginal  rates of transformation  by inducing  domestic  firms to reduce monopoly  elements  in
the production  of non-tradeables.
7Under restricted trade (one extreme  case is autarchy),  domestic  marginal  rates of
transformation  in production  will differ from the foreign marginal  rate of transformadon  of
production  due to the lack of import competition  (See Appendix  figure  B).  Part of this could
be remedied  by competition  policies.  But only by accident  can the domestic  marginal  rate of
transfonnation  be equal to the foreign marginal  rate of transformation  under restricted  trade.
The worst case is when there is restricted trade and reduced  import competition  and no
competition  policies  as there will be monopoly  elements  created  by import bariers.  This
could convert an important  part of the economy  into non-tradeables  with limited  competition
and no corrective  policies  to prevent the emergence  of monopolies. Ihus,  a welfare  ranking
can be established  for the simple  neo-classical.model  of trade (See the Appendix). Free trade
with competition  policy leads to the highest  possible welfare.  Free trade alone will  lead to a
lower level of welfare  compared  to the highest level.  Restricted  trade with competition
policy could be less superior  than free trade with no competition  case especially  in small
economies  where free trade is a powerful competition  instrument. Restricted  tmde with no
competition  policy is the worst of the four possible  combinations  of free trade and
competition. Thus, there is a theoretical  case of complementarity  between  trade and
competition  policies.
Of course, the presence  of economies  of scale and externalities  make the neo-classical
case somewhat  limited. The presence  of economiies  of scale and extemalities  give rise to at
least a temporary  case for departures  from the pure competition  case. This is at the nub of
strategic  tade  theory. At the same time there are risks in attempting  to fine tune trade and
competition  policy because  of another development  of economic  theory, namely  public choice
theory. This points.  to the possible capture of policy maldng  by interested  parties and.  the
danger that public servants,  whose behavior cannot  be monitored,  will engage  in rent
seking.  In this sense  the welfare level achieved  with restricted trade and no competition
policy is still relevant as it would lead to lower levels of welfare.
From a normative  standpoint  trade and competition  policy share the common
economic  objective  of attempting  to remove barriers to the competitive  process and thus
ensuring market access  and presence. These increase efficiency.  Overall, both policies  can
reinforce  each other as seen in the theoretical  framework  . In practice, however,  when other
objectives  are introduced,  as described  below, there could be considerable  friction  in the
trade, competition,  and investment  nexus.
Competition  policy focuses  on the rules of the game over the behavior  and actions  by
market participants,  and as such, it tends to be neutral  in design as opposed  to pro-active.
Through  its deterrent effects, when the legislation  is effectively  enforced, increases  in
competition  and a competitive  environment  can be secured. Trade policies  have traditionally
focused  on facilitating  access to markets, so as to increase  output and realize the associated
benefits, while at the same time maintaining  some level of protection  for the domestic
industries. The arguments  supporting  protecdve components  have been varied, but most often
8they have  been based  on the need  or desire  to shelter,  presumably  temporarily,  incipient
domestic  industries  from more  advanced  and efficient  cost-quality  foreign  competitors,  or
they are based on pressures  from  politically  influential  interest  groups. Aside  from the infant
industry  type, the present  economic  arguments  for protection  are usually  based  on the
externalities  generated  by some  sectors,  particularly  on the diffusion  of technology  and know-
how. In practice  trade policy  tends  to be more pro-active,  in that it can involve  subsidies  of
one form or another,  overt or hidden,  that target or favor some  domestic  sectors  or regions
and erect barriers to foreign  competition  (through  tariffs  or non-triff instruments).  As a
result, trade policy  can either significantly  promote  or substandally  impede  the economic
goals  of competition  policy. At issue then is what is the appropriate  mix  between  trade  and
competition  policies  to best foster  competition,  efficiency,  and growth.
There is a natural  affinity  and opportunity  for convergence  between  trade and
competition  policies. Trade  policies  include  not only border  measures  such  as import  tariffs,
export  duties  and quantitative  restrictions,.  but non-border  measures  as well. For example,
durng the Tokyo  Round,  specification  of technical  standards,  government  procurement,  and
domestic subsidies were included  in the negotiations.  The Uruguay Round included
intellectual  property  rights, trade  related  investment  measures,  and services. This  means  that
the distinction  between  competition  policies  and trade  polices  has become  somewhat  blurred.
Moreover,  many of the trade  policy  instruments  are designed  to deter anti-competitive
practices  by foreign  firms. For example,  if and when  properly  used, ant-dumping  measures
counter  predatory  pricing,  and countervailing  duties  counter  subsidies  as well as overall
unfair  competition.  Competition  policies  also aim to deter those  practices  by domestic  firms.
The growing  extrateiritorial  application  of competition  policy  further  blurs the jurisdiction
and disfinction  between  trade and competition  policies. The  proper extension  of the latter
could  bring into question  the conceptual  need for some  of those  trade policy  instruments.
Free trade and investment  can be a most powerful  competition  inducing
Instrument\policy.  Import  competition  is essential  where  high natural  or strategic  entry
barriers  have  allowed  a few firms  to attain and abuse a dominant  position. Competition  from
imports  is an effective  way of curbing  the exercise  of market  power,  particularly  when
production  technology  calls for scales  typical  of natural  monopoly,  or when  one, or a few,
dominant  local producers  are entrenched  or protected  by high entry  barriers (e.g., scale,  sunk
costs, technology).  To be most  effective  as competition  devices  imports  should  be free from
all restrctions other than a moderate  tariff.  Non-tariff  barriers  should  be removed  and
import  procedures  should  be transparent  and not subject  to discretionary  changes.
The idea that international  competition  through  trade  liberalization  can  act as a
substitute  for domestic  competition  stems  from :Bhagwati  (1965),  where  potential  imports,  as
well as actual  imports,  disciplined  the behavior  of the domestic  producers. In reality  the
effects  of international  competition  on domestic  competition  are insufficient Trade
liberalization  by itself is an inadequate  substitute  for effective  competition  policy  because
alone  it is unlikely  to promote  competitive  market  structures  and ef  ficient  behavior. This  is
the basic finding  from the framework  discussed  below. As a result, trade policy  and
competition  policy are better  regarded,  not as substitutes,  but as complementary  policies.
Among  others, the presence  of non-tradables  is an important  reason  as to why trade  policies
9cannot  be fully substituted  for competition  policies. In other words, a firm producing  a non-
tradable  can have  monopoly  power  and dominate  an industry.
Thus, the distinction  between  tradeables  and non-tradeables  reinforces  the importance
of the incomplete  substitutability  between  trade policy and competition  policy. Trade
liberalization  and import  penetration  do not automatically  lead to increased  competition
because  restrictions  in non-tradeable  services  can form an invisible  barrier  to trade. Non-
tradeable  services,  like marketing  and product  repair, maintenance,  and infrastructure  are
vital for the successful  flow  of imports  and the presence  of various  regulations  and
organizational  barriers  in this area may severely  restrict  import  penetration  and thereby
require  competition  polides to address  the issues.
In a different  perspective,  competition  policy is needed  because  liberal  trade  policies
alone  cannot  enhance  competition  (by  providing  a competitive  market  strucure) in non-
tradeable  services  where the imperfect  market  is local or regional  (e.g., retail tade, services,
infrastructunr  facilities,  particularly  transport).  The same  argument  applies  for trdable
sectors  where  transportation  and border  transaction  costs are an important  component  of the
cost of the  product.
In the presence  of vertical  restraints  and market  foreclosures,  foreign  producers  might
not be able  to distribute  their  products.  The control  of distrbution systems  can lead  to the
privatization  of tariffs  phenomena,  where  domestic  producers  capture  the "tariff"  rents-as
markups  of foreign  goods-and  consumers  lose the benefits  of open  trade. The  case of
Nabisco,  when  it was considering  introducing  its products  in Colombia,  is an exampIe.  Faced
with foreclosures  in the Colombian  food distribution  system,  controlled  by the domestic  food
stuff  producers,  Nabisco  was forced  into a joint venture  with them  and this lead  to parale
pricing  of domestic  and foreign  goods  and a loss cf the competitive  effect,  and the benefits  of
lower prices to consumers.  Similarly, in sectors charactrized  with network structures
(telecommunications,  electicity, gas, etc.) often without  clear or regulated  third  party access
rules and fees, the effect  of import  and foreign  investment  competition  will be moot.
Moreover,  an effective,  through  proper enforcement,  competition  policy  acts as
(patial) insurance  in the event  of rversals in the trade regime,  be it through  the raising  of
tariffs or the abuse of other trade instruments as anti-dumping  and countervailing  duties.
Other  recent developments  that limit competition  are rules of origin  and local content
clauses  adopted  in free trade  agreements. Both discriminate  against  nrnmember  counties
and, as a result, limit market  access  and presence  and thus competition.  Moreover,  the
enforcement  of rules of origin  and local content  clauses  has been  erratic and differential  on
sectoral  basis,  further distordng  competition  and production  in these  economies.
Limits to Trade-biduced  Competition
Despite  the potential  benefits  of trade liberalization  policies,  many countres  choose,
through  trade  policies, to limit  their exposure  to foreign  competition.  The reasons  that
10countries  have  eschewed  the full  potendal  of trade policy  as an instrument  of competition  are
varied. Among  them  are the folldwing.
(a)  Initial  conditions  vary significantly  across  countries  and sectors: The benefits
of free trade are not equally  distributed  across  countries  and sectors.  The share  of
trade  flows  in GDP  varies  significantly  across countries.  This might  lead  to a different
sense  of urgency  amongst  countries  toward  trade liberalization.  These  objectives
would  differ according  to the size of the country,  the alignment  of different  interest
groups,  and the exigencies  of other  priorities. Moreover,  within  a country,  some
sectors  which  are internationally  more competitive  will gain while  other  less
competitive  sectors  will lose. If the political  influence  of the latter  sectors  is larger
than that  of the former,  trade liberalization  is unlikely  to occur or at best  it will be
selective  by sector.
(b)  Temporal  distribution  of the effects  of trade liberalization  may be disruptive:
For many  developing  countries,  and often  as a result  of import  substitution  policies  of
the past and other  protectionist  measures,  the initial  effect  is often  the collapse  of a
number  of non-competitve  industies and firms and associated  job losses.  This effect
'is quite  visible  and the affected  labor and firms are quite  vocal  and create  social  and
political  tensions. On the other hand, the immediate  benefits,  lower  consumer  prices
and greater  selection  of products,  greater  market  discipline,  and the emergence  of
traders,  are widespread  and the individual  impact  not as significant.  This  asymmetry-
-the short  term political  cycle, might  induce  governments  to slow  the pace  of trade
liberlition  and the reaping  the benefits  associated  with  competitive  discipline.  The
long term  benefits  discounted  by current  interest  rates  could  be positive.  Yet, the
short  term costs  may be concentrated  in time and in some  sectors.  In such  a case
protecdon  would  continue  and compettion  remain  limited.
(c)  Comparative  advantages  can be acquired: In the hands  of policy  makers  this
widely  accepted  premise  can lead  to the sheltering  of selected  sectors  from foreign
competition  until  benchmark  competitive  levels  are domestically  achieved. Here the
focus  is on dynamic  or long term eficiency rather than static  or short term  efficiency.
However,  this strategy  can  be prone to misuse  and can lead to long-lasting
protectionist  trade  policies,  either  economy  wide or for designated  sectors.
Elements of Tension  Among  Trade, Investment and Competition  Policies
There  are also  specific  factors  that can undoubtedly  create  tensions  among  trade,
investment,  and competiton  policies. There can be conflicts,  as a result  of economic,  social,
or political  objectives. Objectives  in the design  of those  policies  other than efficiency  are
included  in many  countries,  but these  social  and political  objectives  vary across  countries  and
may often  conffict  with  the target  of economic  efficiency. Substantive  convergence  among
the objectives  of trade,  investment,  and competition  policies  must  first confront  the fact that
the overall  objectives  may  vary from country  to country  as well as initial  conditions.  As the
EC experience  illustrates,  the root cause  appears  to be the substantial  differences  in
individual  country  approaches  to regulation  stemming  from deeply-held  national  convictions
11about the dividing-line between market forces and government intervention.  These
differences can be heightened when trade policies across trading blocks are considered. 3
The threat of protectionism, with its ill effects on competition, always looms over the
design of trade policies. It is often reflected in industrial and regional policies, government
procurement, non-tariff barriers, voluntary exports restraints, subsidies, anti-dumping and
countervailing measures, rules-of-origin measures, standard and other regulation setting, as
well as approaches to foreign investment and ownership. In particular the following specific
factors can be a source of tension between trade, investment, and competition  policies:
Impact of globalization: Globalization of production, research, and marketing
demands larger-scale activities than is present at the national level.
Competition  policy based on, or focused at, a national level might impede the
development of large finns. But, in order to be competitive at a global level,
firms must grow and as a consequence, a  small number of domestic  firms will
control some sectors.
*  Regional policies:  These  policies are often intended to redress a series of
inter related imbalances in regional development, labor market supply, demand
and urban growth. In part,  this concem with distribution is derived from
equity considerations as much as by the need for economic efficiency. Since
they often involved subsidies and other favorable treatment it can lead to
'unfair'  competition  both domestically and in foreign markets.
3  Technical barriers: This refers to the unilateral setting of product standards
and stricter regulations on food, health, and environmentally related products.
Different environmental and consumer protection laws are another source of
conflict and tension. They are often cental  issues in the struggle over trade
agreements. Also govemment pacesetting on anti-pollution and public health
measures can be particularly vulnerable to challenge as unfair trade bafflers
under agreements such as GAIT.  The argument, for example, centers on
whether laws and regulations that are stricter or different  an  international or
treaty norms (say GAIT  or treaty accord), unfairly discriminate against
imports. This can usually be defended so long as its environmental and other
public safety-related  initiatives meet certain tests, including ones based on
science.  The difficulty is that a scientific defense can be a weak one since the
supporting evidence is often inconclusive and can be mobilized  to defend
opposite view points.' There is also the question of the right to set technical
barriers as precautionary measures, when the evidence is ambiguous. Two
recent cases illustrate the point. One is the recent ruling by a GAIT  panel that
30bviously the objectives  need not be as described. As an example, it has been reported that when the EC was
considering what kind of standards  to set for -HDTV  the overwhelming  response appeared to be any standard that
would keep the Japanese out of the EC markeL.
4 Under the World Trade Organization,  following the Uruguay Round, health and santary standards  are defined
less ambiguously.  All these stanards  must be verifiable by an agreed tesL
12a US ban on imported tuna, caught in a manner that causes excessive  dolphin
deaths, is illegal . The other, concerns a challenge brought by the European
Union to America's 'gas  guzzler" tax on cars that fail to meet US fuel
efficiency standards.
Industrial Policies:  This is a major source of conflict. Often the targeting of
industrial sectors involves a combination of protection from foreign
competition and the granting of subsidies, or favorable domestic treatment, or
infant industry treatment. The four instruments of industrial policy are; cheap
loans, net transfers, trade protection, and tax relief. The common arguments
for-an active industrial policy are based on the belief of future high
benefits\rents or the capturing of significant externalities-technology and
know-how. This is a controversial subject.  In addition to some general
promotional measures the government picks winners (or losers as the case of
Japan illustrates). 5 Also, externalities are often associated not with a
partilar  industrial segment, but with a cluster of productive or informational
activities that provide the basis for industrial competitiveness. This is diffcult
for the govement  to target  Often govemments lack the institutional  and
administrative capacity to target effectively and the political will to terminate
the incentives after a set period. It appears more appropriate to focus on
human, technological, and institutional capabilities as a means to shifting
comparative advantage.
Sectoral Shifts and Restructuring:  Another issue is government intervention to
restructure sectors as a result of the impact of sectoral shifts in economic
activity, technological developments, and the lifting of protection and other
barriers.  Often the approach is to link subsidies  with capaity  cuts. Heavy
industry sectors and agriculture are often the affected sectors, (e.g, steel in the
EEC). The aid for restructuring enterprises is offered in exchange for capacity
cuts. The threat of fillU  closure versus partial closure with government  help
tends  to induce firms cooperation.
*  Macroeconomic Exigencies: Trade, investment, and competition  policies have
a broad macroeconomic  impact. As a result, there can be pressures for trade
policy to yield to the macroeconomic exigencies that arise. In the past trade
policies have been used for macroeconomic  purposes when the countries
tightened import restrictions when confronted with balance of payments
difficulties. This was a common approach to dealing with these imbalances.
(Little, Cooper, Corden, and Rajapaiana,  1993). For instance, today in Latin
America there are examples of exchange rate appreciations arising from capital
inflows that have led to pressure on the trade regime for some reversals, even
though open trade as a principle has taken root in the continent.  Argentina,
sBeason  and Weinstein (1994) show that Japanese industrial policy during the period 1955-90  did not pick
wines.  They show a negative correlation between growth ia  each sector and the support provided by various
industrial  policy  instruments.
13Colombia, and Uruguay have shown certaini  departures from the earlier
regimes, in the form of increases tarffs.  Colombia has introduced  reference
prces  for textiles and garments, as well as for eight agricultural goods. ln
this sense trade policies are particularly dependant  on the macroeconomic
environment.
Government  Doctrines: There are a numrber  of outstanding  government
doctrines that provide immunity against certain anti-competitive  actions  or bzr
suits against governments.  For example, in the US there is the 'Noerr-
Penningon  Doctrine' which holds that political activity is immune  from
antitrust laws. As a result, many actions by foreign trade associations  which
may have anti-competitive  effects are protected on the grounds that they are
part of a broader effort to affect government policy. Or the 'Act of State
Doctrine,'  which shields actions by foreign governments.  This bars suits in
which the alleged anti-competitive  behavior is by a foreign government  rather
than a foreign private company.
4.  Antidrumping,  Countervailng,  and Safeguard  Measures: Issues, Risks, and
Consequences
Anti-dumping  and countervailing  duties are imposed in response to what governments
consider to be 'unfair'  trade practices initiated by their trading partners.  The former are a
reaction to dumping which refer to export sales at prices lower  hn  home market sles,
while the latter are a response to subsidies provided by foreign governments  to its industries.
Dumping is considered an activity of a particular firm or enterprse,  whereas subsidies  are
acts of the foreign government. Although the aims of these measures are to promote
international trade on a level playing field, there exists the potential that they will become
protectionist and in fact hinder the gains from trade.
Although these policies are theoretically transparent, in prctice  they are plagued by a
host of definitional and measurement  issues which impede their effectiveness.
LIsues  in anti-dumping
Anti-dumping  cases are increasing. GAIT  records show that during 1985-92  there
were 1,148 anti-dumping  cases, an average of over 150 cases per year, while there were no
more than 12 case per year from 1947-68.  Between 1985 and 1992, the United States
brought some 300 cases, Australia 282 cases, the European Union 242, Canada 129 cases,
Mexico 84, and Brazil 13. The concen  is that these measures  have become protectionist
devices.-
Dumping is defined as the sale of products for export at a price less than normal or
fair value.  Less than fair value pnrcing  arises if: i) foreign firms price discriminate  by
charging a lower price on sales to foreign markets than on sales to their home market or to
third countries; or ii) if foreign firms charge prices on sales to foreign markets hat are
below cost of production ("constructed  value").  The definition  has been extended to refer to
selling below cost in the export market, even if sales below cost are occurring in the firm's
14domestic  market  as well.  A domestic  agency  has to determine  whether  a domestic  industry  is
injured  by unfair  imports.  Once  dumping  has been established  and it is confirmed  tat  this
causes  material  injury  to the domestic  industry  (or retards  the establishment  of a domestic
industry),  an anti-dumping  duty  may  be imposed  on the offending  imports.
DefiWtion  of dwmping
Anti-dumping  laws  define  the practice  of dumping  in terms of price discrimination.
They  do not require  that predatory  intent  be demonstrated,  and they only  demand  that injury
be shown  to a particular  industry  rather to competition  or welfare  in general. In so doing  the
laws can target what  can essentially  be rational  competitive  behavior  which  does  not
necessarily  decrease  Qong  term)  welfare. In consequence,  the definition  of dumping  itself
allows  for situations  in which  anti-dumping  duties  may be inappropriate.  First, when
dumping  is merely  an international  extension  of price discrimination  and the foreign  exporter
sells  exports  at a lower price  abroad  than in the exporting  country  (as a result  of having  more
market  power  at home),  but above  cost, this would  be considered  dumping. However,
although  import  competitors  may be hurt, the distortion  that needs  to be addressed  is the
higher  price at the home  of the exporter,  and the lower  price would  be a net benefit  to the
importng  country  via an increase  in consumer  welfare.
Using  the definition  of dumping  below cost, and defining  cost  to be average  cost, it is
clear that dumping  can  be a rational  profit-maximizing,  non-predatory  behavior  of a fim in
the short run, as long as it covers  its marginal  cost during  periods  of slack  demand. This
te  of dumping  may also  occur  in a situation  where the structure  of costs  is different  for
exporters  and for domestic  firms. For example,  foreign  exporters  may view  a larger
proportion  of their costs  as fixed  (e.g., Japanese  viewing  labor as a fixed  cost, while  the
USA  views  it as variable  cost),  and in periods of diminished  demand  in the domestic
economy,  prices  may fall quickly  below  the marginal  costs  of domestic  firms, who  will exit
the industry,  while remaining  above  the lower marginal  cost of foreign  exporters. So in this
situation,  exports  displace  domestic  production,  but only due to the higher  fixed  costs  of
exports.-
There  are also other  reasons  why firms  may price below  marginal  cost as a part of an
inter-temporal  profit maximization.  Slapping  anti-dumping  duties  on these  products  provides
domestic  firms with protection,  but it may be costly  in terms  of national  and consumer
welfare. The argument  for anti-dumping  duties  is that firms  may  be using  dumping  in a
predatory  manner  to eliminate  competition  and then raise the price once  the competition  is
eliminated.  This is a controversial  issue. To be successful  it requires  the existence  of sunk
costs and the expectation  by potential  entrants  that the same  behavior  by the dumping  firm
will occur  were they to enter  the market.  Also, dumping  and subsidies,  from the exporter
point  of view, can  be justified  if the firm or home country  derives  significant  externalities  in
the production  of the goods  or if there  are scale effects.  The latter can  justify  pricing  below
the average domestic  price, since in that case, marginal cost are lower than avenage  costs.
Another  explanation  for pricing  below marginal  cost may  be that the firm's objective
is not profit maximization,  but sales  maximization  and the expansion  of market  share. In the
15former case, it is argued that managers  of firms are not primarily maximizing  shareholder
profits since they are rewarded  according  to the growth  rate of the firm (i.e., size of
operation/sales  maximization). The excess  output depresses  price, harming  competitors  and
expanding  consumer  surplus. Similarly,  the firm's objective  may be to capture  market share
by reducing  prices as in the case of 'experience  goods.' A producer will sell to its export
market at a dumped  price while  its product is new and unfamiliar  to the market,  and then
will raise price once a preference  for it has been developed.
Anti-dumping  duties, however,  may not be the first best resonse to such  a situation.
The importing  country  could gain from the cheaper  imports  if it could credibly  threaten  to
tax imports  only after they become  monopolized,  thereby  taxing away the monopoly  profits
which were the initial  lure for the predatory  behavior. Also, competition  policy,  when
properly  enforced  could very well substitute  for anti-dumping  measures.  Both predation  and
abuse of dominant  position  are sanctioned  behavior  under standard  competition  policy
legislation.  Applying  extraterritorial  jurisdiction, and this appear  to be the trend, to
competition  policies would  cover non-competitive  pricing/behavior  by foreign  firms.
Ambiguity i,  Determining the Duty
First determining  what is 'normal' leaves much room for interpretation  and in
attempting  to determine  prices of sales in the domestic  market of the foreign  producer,  sales
to related companies  and so on have  been excluded. Originally,  sales below  cost in the
exporting  market  were excluded  in determining  price, but more recently they have  been
included. In some  cases there may be no, or an inadequate  (deemed  to be less than 5%-  in
.the  USA and the EC), amount  of domestic  sales. In such a case there are two options  which
pexpetuate  further ambiguity-one  of which is obtaiming  a comparable  price of a 'like' product
when  exported  to a third market  This leads to different  interpretations  of 'like' products,
ranging  from physical  similarity  to functional  similarity. The other option  is to determie
the costs of production  plus 'reasonable' administrative  and selling  costs plus profits. This
again leaves  room for much discretion  in determining  the duty.  Similarly,  there exists  much
subjectivity  in determining  injury  and attributing  causation  to dumping.
Impact of Dumping Practices
There is a widespread  belief that unfair trade practices, including  sales of goods  at
less than fair value (dumping),  and subsidization  of industry  by foreign  governments,  injure
domestic  industries,  drive finrs out of business,  and create unemployment.  This belief  has
rallied the private sector  and governments  to amend  their laws against  dumping  and
subsidized  imports, facilitating  the relief of injured firms. Despite  this passionately  held
belief  it is interesting  that little  effort has been  placed on evaluating  the consequences  of such
actions. The central premise, that unfairly  traded imports  have been a serious  problem,  has
remained  largely unexamined.  There  is a recent analysis (Morkre  and Kelly, 1994),  of the
effects  of those actions  on US domestic  industries  from 1980-88,  between  two important
changes  in the law: the Trade Act of 1979, which implemented  the agreements  reached  in the
Tokyo Round and the Trade Act of 1988.  The Trade Act of 1979 introduced an injury test
for most subsidized  imports  (previously,  only duty free imports  were given  an injury  test)
16and made  substantial  changes  in procedures  for the administation  of the law, inter  alia, strict
time limits  for the various  phases,  and instructed  the President  to submit  a reorganization
plan to improve  enforcement  of the unfair  import  laws. The question  posed  in that study  was
not if there was injury, but rather  the magnitude  of the injury.
The US International  Trade  Commission  made  decisions  on 221 cases.  There  was
very good information  on 179  of those  cases to make  an assessment  of the magnitude  of the
injury. Of those  179 cases,  only  53, or less than one third, induced  a loss in domestic
revenues  as the resuLt  of unfairly  traded  imports  that could  be greater  than 5 %. Of those,
only 21 cases  involved  a loss  in revenue  that could  be greater  than 10%. Moreover,  the study
went to great lengths  to overstate  the cases  in favor of injury. Therefore,  the reported  injury.
levels  are an upper  bound. Industries  are diverse, from agriculture  and consumer  goods  to
raw materials  and industral products  and in the analysis,  the benefits  consumer  derived  from
purchasing  at lower  pdces was not considered.
Another  undesirable  by-product  of anti-dumrpi-ng  measures  is its potential  use as a
collusion  instrument.  The EC experience  shows  that anti-dumping  actions  have  come  to be
used  as a means  of price collusion.  Often  domestic  pnces have  stabilized  after a decrease  and
foreign  ones  have  increased.  So clearly  there are tradeoffs.  Obviously,  the elimination  of
anti-dumping  measures  could  induce  a more competitive  domestic  market, at the risk,
however  small,  of the potential  long term consequences  of predation.
When  a country  applies  anti-dumping  duties  on a particular  product  originating  from a
particular  country, it may  lead  to 'country hopping'  and 'product  shifting'  in an attempt  to
avoid  the duties. The offending  country  may move  production  to the jurisdiction  which
imposed  the anti-dumping  duty  or to a third country. They may also  produce  a slightly
differentiated  product  to escape  the duty.
Different  countries  have  different  approaches  and interpretations  of GATI articles,
such  as the definition  of "like t products  discussed  above. There  are also  different  levels  of
discretion  allowed  in different  countries. The US system  is considered  most  mechanical.
Duties  are automatically  imposed  equal  to the calculated  dumping  margin,  whereas  other
systems  may confidentially  indicate  minimum  prices  under which  duties  would  be imposed.
Issues in Countervailg  Measures
Similar  to anti-dumping  duties,  countervailing  measures  are undertaken  to offset
adverse  effects  of a foreign  country's  trade policies  on domestic  industry,  and deter foreign
governments  from intervening  with targeted  subsidy  policies  in the first place  (reverse
foreign  aid). As stated  in GAIT Article  VI:3, 'these duties  are for the purpose  of offsetting
any.  bounty  or subsidy  bestowed,  directly  or indirectly,  upon  the manufacture,  production,  or
export  of any merchandise'  on the part of the foreign  government.  GAT  differ
subsidies  in research  and development  between  applied  and basic research. However,  it is
often  difficult  to differentiate  between  these two types. Since  subsidies  that increase  exports
tend to shift  profits  away  from  rival unsubsidized  firms,  other producing  nations  consider  this
unfair  behavior. The countervailing  duty provisions  in GAUT  were developed  to address
17these  concerns, and GAIT rules allow (once a material  injury  test confirms  the harm to
domestic  industry)  a maximum  duty limited  by the total subsidy  amount  or payment  that is
embodied  in the imports  of the country  setting  the duty (an equal payment  tariff). An equal
export tariff offsets  the effect of a foreign  subsidy  on the marginal  costs of the subsidized
firm, maintaining  the level of exports  to the country imposing  the duty.
Determining  the Extent of the Subsidy
Although  a subsidy  is beneficial  for the recipient  industry,  generally  given  perfect
competition  it is not so for national  welfare. However, a nationaL  gain is possible  when
domestic  oligopolists  compete  with their foreign  counterparts  in a third country. (Brander-
Spencer, 1985)
In order to prevent  profit-shifting  from the domestic  industry  to the foreign  industry
receiving  the subsidy, countervailing  duties are imposed. However,  GAIT provisions  fail to
specify  a method  by which the total subsidy  payment should  be calculated,  leaving  a wide
latitude  in which to determine  the value of the subsidy. For exmple, to calculate  the
subsidy  value of a govemment  loan to industry, US authorities  use the commercial  interest
rates that firms  would have otherwise  had to pay to obtain  that loan, whereas  in the EC the
interest  rate that is used is the one at which tht government  borrows.
importance  of the lype of Subsidy
The appropess  of countevailing duties depends  on the type of subsidy  issued by
the foreign  government. Since  export subsidies  to non-primary  products  have  been banned  in
the original  GAIT provisions  (1948),  an analysis of different  types  of capital  subsidies  is
more useful  If the government  provides  interest-rate  subsidies  and these  loans  are
designated  to pay off existing  diebt,  then little or no countervaiing  action is required,  and an
equal  payment  taiiff would  probably  reduce exports and profits  of subsidized  fims below
their pre-subsidy  levels.
However,  interest rate subsidies  to existing  capital  (given  imperfect  capital  markets),
and subsidies  specified  for additional  capital  only tend to reduce  the marginal  cost of the
fin,  expand  output and cause  harm to foreign  producers. In the former  case, a
countervailing  equal  payment  tariff will be more than sufficient  to prevent  harm to industries
in the importing  country, but with respect  to the latter case, an equal  payment  tariff may
even be insufficient  to prevent  harm to rival firms in the importing  country. This result
depends  on the size of the interest  rate subsidy  relative to the market  rate of interest,  the
elasticity  of substitution  between  capital  and labor, and the extent of scale  economies.
in responding  to research  and development  subsidies,  countervailing  duties  are
unlikely  to be helpful  because  by the time the subsidized  firm is at the production  (and
export)  phase,  -the  foreign  rivals  have already been harmed  and any duty would  mainly  hurt
the importing  country  tirough higher  consumer  prices.  More direct research  and
development  subsidies  aimled  at cutting  marginal costs of production  may act more like
subsidies  to additional  capital,  in which case an equal  payment  tariff would  be appropriate.
18Similarly,  the appropriate  actions  regarding  grants and equity  infusions  also  depend  on the
nature of their specification.
Safeguard Measures
Safeguards  refer to government  actions  responding  to imports  which  are said  to hann
the import  country's  economy  or domeztic  competing  industries.  Thus safeguards  refer to
import  restraining  means  whether  they  be increased  tariffs,  quantitative  restrictions,  or
"voluntary  restraints"  by the exporting  country, or similar  measures.  The concept also
embraces  the "escape  clause."  The economic  argument  for safeguards  is that an increase  in
imports  could  cause  harm to selected  groups  wthin the importing  country.  Competing
industries  would  have  to adjust  to the imports,  either  by improving  their competitiveness  or
by moving  resources  away  from that industry  to some  other industry.  Consequently,  a
temporary  period  of adjustment  is deemed  to be necessary.  The other argument  for
safeguards  is more  political.  Because  producers  are better  placed  to seek and get protection
of a permanent  nature  by providing  a temporary  measure  it is felt that a more  permanent
increase  in protection  could  be avoided.
The most  significant  mechanism  of the international  trading  system  is the escape
clause  under  GATT  Article  XIX. For the clause to be put into effect it must  be shown  that
imports  are increasing  absolutely  or relatively  and this is the causal  result of unforeseea
circumstances.  It must  also  be shown  that domestic  producers  are seriously  injured  or
threatened  with serious  injury  and that this injury  has been  caused  by the increased  imports.
In these  circumstances,  the importing  country  is entitled  to suspend  GATI7  obligations  in
respect  of the product  for such  time as necessary  to prevent  or remedy  the injury.  The
importing  country  should  consult  with the paries  at  are major  exporters  of the product  to
reach  an agreement  on the means  the injury could be avoided.  If such  an agreement  cannot
be reached,  the exporters  have  the right to suspend  equivalent  concessions  in response  to
restrictions  imposed  by the injured  party.
As can be noted, many  of the problems  associated  with anti-dumping  are also  present
in the safeguard  measure.  They  relate to definitions  of unforeseen  circumstance,  serious
injury  and the fact that industries  can  be injured  by many  other  causes  other ta  the
imports.
The safeguard  mechanism,  however,  is better  for competition  than anti-dumping.  If it
could be made  strictly  temporary,  fully  transparent,  non-discriminatory  and could  be granted
following  a thorough  review  of where  domestic  adjustment  efforts  could  be undertaken
during  the Lifetime  of the safeguard.  A safeguard  mechanism  would  have  the advantage  of
concentrating  on the domestic  industry,  rather that finding  fault with foreign  business
practices.  However,  and not surprisingly,  industries  prefer  to go the anti-dumping  route
rather han safeguards.  There  are several  reasons  for this. First, the industry  must admit  that
it cannot  compete  to invoke  the safeguard  prvision.  Second,  restrictions  arising  from
safeguards  have  to be imposed  on a most favored  nation  basis.  Third, the importing  country
must pay compensation  to countries  whose  imports  are restricted.  Finaliy,  the restrictions
19must be reduced  progessively.  These  reasons make  safeguards  less popular  with  industries,
even though  from a liberal  trade policy  viewpoint  safeguards  are superior  to anti-dumping.
Risks  and Consequences  of Anti-dumping,  Countervailing,  and  Safeguard  Measures
The  proliferation  of the use  of anti-dumping  and countervailing  measures,  as against
safeguard  measures,  have  led to fears tat  they may  be used  as a mere protectionist  tool and
the GATT  has proved  to be ineffective  in disciplining  the use and abuse  of ani-dumping
actions.'6  The reason  lies in the excessively  broad GAIT rules and the excessive  discretion
and judgement  provided  on th.e  part of those administering  national  laws, so that few  actions
would  qualify  as GAIT 'violations.' Political  economy  issues  are important  since  there may
be room for political  manipulaton  (be it direct or through  lobbying)  in the findings  of
dumping  and/or injury  (from  dumping  and foreign  subsidies). There  also appears  to be an
inherent  bias in the system  in favor  of the domestic  complainants,  and to some  extent,  this
has been  attributed  to a 'ratcheting  effect.'  This refers to a situation  where  incremental
technical  canges in the national  laws tend to favor  protectionist  interests  and enhance  the
ikelihood  of finding  dumping  and/or  injury, unless trading  partners  are also  willing  to be
more liberal.
Caution  is also necessary  in imposing  these duties  since  a duty  perceived  as unfair  is
likely  to result  in furither  retaliaton,  leading to an escalation  of tariffs  and other  protectionist
measures  in both countries,  thereby  worsening  the situation. It is important  to respond  to
'unfair' trade practices  of trading  partners,  but too wide a class  of cases may  lead  to firther
protecton.  Some  govemments,  for example,  respond  only to targeted  subsidies  of trading
partner governments,  and do not react to untargeted  subsidies.
AIso,  all of the mentioned  trade policy efforts  provide  temporary  relief  from import
competition  for the affected  industies, but weaken  growth  and efficiency  prospects  for the
post-recovery  phase. Moreover,  resources  are likely to be diverted  to rent-seeking,  slowing
restructuring  efforts  which  would  render  industries  fit as future  exporters.  Reduced
competition  in product  market,  furthermore,  tends to increase  both  price pressures  and wage
pressures  with  negative  implications  for the competitiveness  of other  sectors  and for
employmenL
In spite  of potentially  large legal costs, anti-dumping  laws  and countervailing  duties
are important  and may be considered  the international  dimension  to national  competition
policy.. It has also  been  argued  that it serves the purpose  of an 'interface  mechanism'  which
facilitates  trade among  very different  economic  entities.
Finally, an argument  can  be made for the replacement  of anti-trust  laws\policy  with
trade laws\policy.  As integration  and globalization  furthers  the irrelevance  of borders  the
need for trade measures  becomes  less clear. In that context,  a harmonized  and-tust
legislation  might  suffice  to deter anti-competitive  behavior.
'During  the 1989-94  period,  only 15  anti-dumping  actions  have  been  dLe  subject  of GA1T  dispute  settlement.
Of these,  five  anti-dumping  actions  have  been  found  to be in violation  of GAIT mles,  but noci has  been  removed.
20.With the trade liberalizations  in Latin America there has been a clamor  by domestic
industries  to adopt anti-dumping,  countervailing,  and safeguard  provisions.  These  are now
being adopted.  There is the fear, however,  that these provisions  could turn into to
protectionist  devices that would stifle  competition.  It is a common  experience  in the case of
the trade liberalization  in the industrial  countries  that with reduced  tariffs, a new type of
protection  aises.  It is sometimes  called  process  protection. As triffs  have  dropped,  the
number  of anti-dumping  and countexvailing  cases have significantly  increased. For example,
the amount  of countervailing  actions  has increased  five fold in the United  States  since  the
1970s. Likewise,  for anti-dumping  cases  between  NAFTA countries. Other  approaches  to
limit trade and competition  also increased  such as the VERs. Some  have argued  that the
introduction  of these so-called  grey area projections  was the result of an inadequate  safeguard
mechanisms. In this regard, the exiting  GAIT law has been faulted.  The new  laws are not
very much  better. These  rules, designed  during the Uruguay  Round, are vague  enough  to
give individual  countries  enough  latitude  to use them for protectionist  purposes.  There  are
two factors  that will militate  against  the use of these measures  as protectionists  devices.  First
is the strengthening  of the dispute  settlement  mechanism  under the WTO. Second  is the
attempt  to make the safeguard  mechanism  more attractive  compared  to anti-dumping.  Finally,
the conviction  of countries  to use trade instruments  to increase  competition  and eschew
protection  is the best guard  against  use-of these trade measures  as protectionist  devices.
Few countries  have applied  anti-dumping  with great restraint  and a high degree  of
professionalism. Anti-dumping  and other similar  provisions  are often politically  necessary  to
keep the "opening"  process  worling, since  the government  could say that it would  tackle
unfair competition  through  this means. The Colombian  government  has adopted  a safeguard
going beyond  GAIT, Article  XIX. It has the proper approach  in terms of maintaining
competition.  First, the Colombian safeguard  measure  requires  that the injury  be real rather
than threatened.  Second,  the time period  given as relief is one year zather  than four years-  in
the GAIT  article.
On countervailing  duties  the situation  is less sanguine.  They are less resorted  to  an
anti-dumping.  The proof of a government  subsidy  is more difficult  to establish,  given  that
there are more indirect  subsidies.  Moreover, there are special  problems  associated  with the
measurement  of subsidies  particularly  in socialist  countries  where market  prices  are not well
established.  Hence, the problems  with the exports from China  and the countries  of the
former Soviet  Union. However,  preventing  a greater recourse  to the use of countervailing
measures  is the increased  sancton given to the subsidy  codes, which  had been adopted  in the
Tokyo  Round  but not put into wide practice. Following  the Uruguay  Round  there are better
definitions  and a more effective  mechanism,  including  the dispute  settlement  mechanism,  that
will reduce  the prospects  of using  countervailing  actions  at the source  of the subsidization.
Finally, the extra-territorial  application  of competition  law, often implemented  on the basis of
unilateal judgements,  is another  source  of tension  that must be addressed,  preferably  through
treaties  and harnonization  of enforcement  efforts.
While the above issues  and chalenges have arisen with respect  to the use of the trade
measures  that have the potential  to limit domestic  competition,  traditional  trade reforms  have
progressed  well in the world  since  the 1970s.  This is best seen in Latin America.  In this
21sense  the traditional  protectionist  devices  have been subdued  but the new protectionist
measures  as contained  in the anti-dumping,  countervailing,  and safeguards  pose  more of a
threat in the future. The Uruguay  Round  had been singularly  successful  in limiting  the scope
for protection  via tariffs  and quantitative  restrictions  and subsidies  to exports.  This gives
hope that the remaining  agenda  for promoting  competition  through the trade measure  is in the
administrative  or process  protection  practiced  by the industrial  countries  since the 1970s.
S.  The  Results of 7rade Reforns and Competition  Policies In Latin America
What  evidence  is available  as to the results of trade reforms supports  the view that
they have been  beneficial  in terms of improving  allocative  efficiency,  increasing  exports,  and
leading  to higher  overall growth. There are a number  of studies  that confirm  the beneficial
effects  of trade liberalizations  on efficiency  and growth. These  are the efficiencies  gained
through.  competition  and overcoming  of the limitations  of the domestic  market,  the need  to
adjust exchange  rates and adopt less distortionary  policies  under more open trade regime,  and
the creation  of X-efficiency  due to import competition.
Statistical  support  for the beneficial  effects  of trade refonns on economic  development
is found  in a number  of studies.  Over fifty such studies  are cited by Edwards,  (1993);  and
Levine and Renelt, (1991).  Using the new growth theory approach  where policy can affect
the rate of growth (the neo-classical  models  do not allow for this) Krueger  and Osmond
11990)  find that distortions  on the trade and payment  regime  are negatively  correlated  with
growth  rates.
Trade reforms  in a sample  of sixteen  Latin American  and Caribbean  countries  led to
import growth  in ten cases. -In the other six, there was low import  demand  given  the strong
fiscal  adjustment  that accompanied  the reforms and sharp  increases  in relative  prce of
imports  given the large devaluations.  (Alam  and Rajapatirana,  1993) One can surmise  that
the increase  in imports  did increase  competition  in the import  substituting  sector. In some
cases, while import  liberalization  did not lead to an immediate  increase  in imports  and
therefore  did not increase  competition,  there were import surges  in a year or two.  This is
the case of Colombia. Following  the acceleration  of import liberalization  in 1992  there was
only a small increase in imports.  But eighteen months later, imports increased by some fifty
percent. The other piece of evidence  for increased  competition  following  import
liberalization  is the increase  in demands  for protection  in the sectors  that were more  affected
by the imports  or where competition  had increased  strongly. This is the case in Colombia
with textiles  and garments,  as well as agriculture,  some  industrial  products  in Argentina  and
footwear  in Venezuela.
Recent  re-interpretation  of the East Asian  countries' success  with -exports  and income
growth  has identified  the discipline  derived from competition  as a powerful  factor. All the
Asian countries,  except  Hong Kong, went through  an import substitution  phase. These
countries  established  a near free trade regime for exports  and subjected  exports  to export
rivalry. They did liberalize  their import regimes  over time  and presumably  increased  foreign
competition  for their import substituting  industries. While this exactly  the sequence  was the
cause of their success  cannot  be adequately  known  because  of the difficulty  of finding  a
counter  factual. However,  Hong Kong did face import  competition  from the beginning  and
22Thailand,  Indonesia,  and Malaysia  experienced  increases  in efficiency  when  their  import
regimes  were libtulized. (World  Bank, 1994)
Regarding  competiton  policies,  there.  is much  still to be accomplished  in Latin
America. Only  six  countries  have  enacted  comprehensive  anti-trust  legislation,  Chile,
Venezuela,  Peru, Mexico,  Colombia,  and Jamaica. And most  of this legislation  has  been
enacted  only within  the  last two  years. Therefore,  there  is little  record  to evaluate.  Yet,
some  of the positive  results  of competition  policies  in Latin  America  are already  apparenL
In Venezuela  it has had a significant  impact in brealdng  and detering existing  pnrce
agreements  among  competitors.  In Chile  a main focus  has  been  the successful  brealing  of
vertical  restraints,  while  Mexico  has  focused  on merger  policy  and in more  the  former  than
the latter breaking  collusive  practices.  Peru has successfully  facilitated  entry  and exit  in
economic activity and deterred distributional restraints and misleading  informational
practices. Common  issues  in all these  countries  are scarcity  of resources  and  little
expenence  to properly  enforce  the legislation  (Guasch,  1994).
6.  The Case  for Harmonzation
As the process  of globalization  and deep integration  continues  throughout  the region
via adherence  to GATr or the forming  and extension  of tading blocks  or trough unilateral
free trade  policies,  the issue  of harmonization  of laws, regulations,  and policies,  across
countres looms  larger. Different  regulatory,  legal or even  governance  systems  affect  market
access  and market  presence,  and hamper  integration  mintiatives.  Moreover,  the positive
interplay  between  trade  and  competition  policies  is facilitated  and enhanced  with
harmonization  of laws, regulations,  and policies.
The virtues  and rationale  of integrated  countries  and harmonized  systems  are clear.
They  max=-ze global  economic  efficiency,  and minimize  transaction  cost-both  public  and
private  - and uncertinty. Heterogeneous  laws, regulations,  and enforcement  provide  for
unfair  competitive  advantages,  retrain trade,  -and  hamper  rlization  of the potential  benefits
of open trade  policies. In establishing  compatibilities,  harmonization  expands  markets  and
inceases access  and opportunities,  eliminates  unfair  trade  advantages,  increases
transparency,  and facilitates  competition.  The magnitude  of the  potential  benefits  from
different  levels  of integration  are thus  considerable.
There  are also  costs. Harmonization  hampers  experimentation,  imposes  loss  of
sovereignty,  breaches  cultural  and objective  differences.  It involves  high set  up costs  and
there  are costs in resolving  differences  in objectives  and of selecting  salienttconsensus
modes.
The harmoniztion  process  must:  i) deal with  divergences  in both substance  and
enforcement  and with  the choice  of focus  between  principles,  practices  or a mix;  ii)
recognize  that different  enforcement  levels  of harmonized  legislation  affects  adversely  trde
and competition;  iii) establish  priorities  on what should  be harmonized  as well  as desirable
and minimal  levels  of harmonization;  iv) be imbedded  in treaties;  v) recognize  the need  for
the establishment  of a binding  supranational  body  to enforce  compliance  and resolve  disputes,
so as to harmonize  enforcement;  vi) understand  when  and  how mutual  recognition  practices
23should be adopted within a harmonization  initiative; vii) recognize that some harmonization
can be induced through competitive  or market pressures; and viii) clarify if and when
exemptions  or stricter norms  should  be allowed so as not to excessively  weaken
harmonization.
Substantive  convergence  or harmonization  must first confront the fact that the overall
objectives  may vary from country  to country as well as initial conditions. Objectives  other
than efficiency  are often included  by many countries, but these social and political  objectives
vary across countries and may often conflict  with the target of economic  efficiency. As the
EC experience illustrates, the root cause appears to be the substantial  differences  in country
approach to regulation and policies  stemming from deeply-held  national convictions  about the
dividing-line  between market forces and govenment intervention. 7
In consequence,  any harmonization  inimtaive  would  have to accept that important
differences  in substantive  laws will remain for the foreseeable  future, because of differing
policy goals, legal traditions, substantive  transaction costs associated  with changes  or inertia.
Also, when pursuing harmonization  initiatives, there is the risk that in trying to reconcile
different views and objectives,  the resulting agreed upon harmonization  will be excessively
broad and vague and thus ineffective.
The constituencies  for harnonization are multiple. There are muliional  enterprises
(MNEs)  seking  to reduce transaction  costs.$  It is also in the interest of many home
countries to reduce the risks of investment  flight, since investment today is highly mobile  and
responds  to best treatment and harmonization  can reduce the risk of relocations. Finally,
another constituency  is the multilateal or  tion  in their quest to promote global
efficiency.
To illustrate the relevance  of harmonizaton and its potential  impact, it might suffice
to consider one aspect of the legislation-domestic competition  policies.  This is a critical
area for all trading nations. The last several years have seen a sharp ise in the frictions
arising from the interplay of domestic  competition policies  in the areas of merger reviews, in
the arrangement  between buyers and suppliers  in domestic markets and in the use of domestic
laws in foreign jurisdictions. For example, merger policy differs across countries. A
merger today can involve opertions spanning a host of countries thus involving  applications
to competition  authorities  in many  jurisdictions at the regional, national, and subnational
level.  An example of this is Siemens and  iEC referring their bid for Plessey separately  to
the British, German, French, and Italian govemments, and in addition, to the Europen
Commission. A recent US merger case, required 17 different filings, since the case
impacted 17 different jurisdictions.
7This echoes  the conflict  between  the US and Japan on the role of product  liability versus detailed  regulation
specification.
'To  provide an indication  of the extent of !hat constituency,  it suffices to mention that by the 1990's MNEs
accounted  for over 80% of US trade. Equally  important,  worldwide  sales of foreign  affiliates  of all counties were
nearly twice the value of.world exports  of goods and sevices  underlying  the fact that investment  as well as trade
is  an  essental route of access to foreign  markets.
24Conflicts between domestic competition  policies and interlinkages  with trade policy
will keep increasing as multinationals  expand through foreign direct investment, and as
transnational mergers, joint-ventures, production and research consortia also increase in
frequency.  These cross-border ventures and the existence of differing competition  laws
across countries will exacerbate  competition and trade disputes. The evidence already is the
increasingly anti-trust-related  trade disputes and trade-related anti-trust disputes, particularly
between Japan, the US and the EC. Different environmental and consumer pmtection laws
are another source of conflict and tension in harmonization initiatives and tend to affect
adversely the interplay between trade polices and competition policies.
Similar issues and frictions appear on harmonization of the regulatory environment,
the setting of standards, of foreign investment and ownership laws, of labor and benefits
laws, of the intellectual  property laws, of the tax structure, industrial policies, etc.
Finally, as important is the harmonization of enforcement and of resolution of
disputes.  Without it, effective harmonization will not result.  This requires supranational
institutions and dispute resolution mechanisms with binding resolutions. The apparent trend
toward the use of extraterritoril jurisdiction is not a fully satisfactory mechanism  and can
lead to contradictions.
7.  Conclusions
As a result of the far reaching trade reforms undertake  in the 1980s and the 1990s,
Latin American and Caribbean economies are among the most open in the developing  world.
Significant reforms have also taken place in the area of foreign investment legislation  to
allow foreign firms market presence, although some selectve areas have been left protected.
However, reforms in competition  policy legislation and particularly its appropriate
enforcement are yet to be addressed in most Latin American countries. The incresed
globalization  of the economies  requires a compreenseve and integrated approach to those
policies with tendencies  toward haimonization of both policies and enforcement. The
complementarities  are clear, and so too are the opportunities for tension between trade and
competition  policies.  The latter are rooted on the historical antecedents  of these policies, the
short term vision induced by political cycles, tempting opportunistic  responses to economic
downturns, timing differences  between accrued benefits and costs, and that even within the
existing GAIT law several anti-competitive  trade policies are permitted.  Thus for example,
the so-called grey areas of protection, VERs, anti-dumping, and countervailing  actions can be
controverted to reduce the force of international competition. The pressure to revert to the
use of those instruments  as protectionism devices is ever present and the evidence of those
practices is already ample.  Trade policy may have to yield to the macroeconomic  exigencies
that arise.  For example, today in Latin America there are examples of exchange  rate
appreciations arising from-capital inflows that have led to pressure on the trade regime for
some reversals, even though open trade as a principle has taken root in the continent.
Argentina, Colombia, and Uruguay have shown certain departures from the earlier regimes
in the.form of increases in some barriers.  Colombia has introduced  reference prices for
textiles and garments, as well as for eight agricultural goods.  In th:is  sense, both trade and
competition  policies are dependant  on the macroeconomic environment.
25Similar  evidence,  as previously  reported, is a cause  for concern  and exists  in the
possibility  of anti-dumping,  countervailing,  and safeguard  measures  tuming  into protectionist
measures  and limiting  competition  as a result.  Mexico  and Brazil have  been the most active
in Latin America  in the use of those  instruments. The institutional  design  of the
corresponding  agencies  is crucial  to limit reversals  and rent-seeking  opportunities.
Colombia,  Argentina,  and Trinidad  and Tobago  have  recently  adopted  these  laws,
conformning  along the lines  of existing  GAIT principles. The institutional  arrangements  for
implementing  these  policies  would  become  highly  relevant  from a political  economy  point of
view. For, if the institutions  that administer  these measures  within  a country  are not
carefully  constituted,  they could  be captured by protectionist  and and-competitive  interests.
Therefore,  adherence  to GAIT principles  alone, dose  not always  lead to competition.  There
is, therefore,  the danger,  that these  measures  could be the new methods  for protection,
imitating  industrial  country  policies.
The emergence  of trading  blocs in Latin America  and the new  Andean  Port, as
desirable  as they are, have  further  raised some  tensions. First, there have  been  recent
departures  from the most favored  nation principle  with the prolifeation of regional
integrtion arrangements. While  they are permitted  under article  XXIV  of the GAIT, the
provisions  of the article  have hardly  even been followed. Jackson  (1989)  has remarked  that
the departure  from that particular  e  have been rife.  Even  if the rules had been  duly
followed  to the letter, there would  stil exist the need to harmonize  the regulatory
environments  so as to enhance  competition  with the reduction  in trade baris  within  a
trading  bloc. Second,  the potential  and already  evident  in some  cases, use of rules of origi
as anti-competitive  and protectionist  devices.
Similarly,  the lack of enthusiasm  of many  Latin American  countries  in adopting  and
embracing  competition  policies  should  be a source of concern.  However,  recent  measures
taken by a number  of countries  provides  for some reassuance that the tide is tuming  and that
most countries  are become  aware  of the relevance  of having  integrated  and complementary
trade and competition  policies,  notwithstanding  the pressures  and temptations  for reversals..
The current  efforts  should  be directed  toward  the implementation  of comprehensive
competition  policies  and credible  enforcement  agencies. They should  also be aimed  toward
the gradual  phasing  out of most of the trade policy instruments,  such  as anti-dumping,
countervailing  duties  and safeguards  and their replacement  by a broader  application  of
competition  policies  and of extraterritorial  jurisdiction. 9 Competition  policies,  when  broadly
used can effectively  substitute  for most trade instruments.  Restrictions  on foreign  investments
and ownership  should  be fully  eliminated.  This should  facilitate  the captiring in the home
country  of a larger share  of the benefits  of trade liberalization.  Moreover,  efforts  should.
continue  toward  the hannonization  and enforcement  of those  policies  across  countries  and
toward the creation  of binding  supranational  enforcement  institutions.
9An  innovative  and welcomed  step in that direction is the institutional  design  of Peru's competition  enforcemet
agency, INDECOPY. It has been given jurisdiction to enforce both trade and competition  policies.
Z6Appendix  A: Analytical  Basis  of Complementarity  between  Trade and Competition  Policies
In the standard  neo-classical  model of trade with two goods, (x x 2) a small country
assumption  and community  udlty funcdons,
four cases are possible for the interaction  of  Figure  A. Free Trade
trade and competition  policy.  These  are: case
1, free trade with competition  policy; case 2,  case (1)
free trade with no comrpetition  policy; case 3,  Cass (2)
restricted  trade with competidon  policy; and
case 4,  restricted trade with no competition.
policy.  Case 1,  which gives the highest
utlity, is free trade  combined  with  competition
policy. This  is seen in figure  A which shows
free  trade  with  and without  competition  policy.  U2
The values for utility shown  by Ut is superior
to  the other three  possibilities. The case of
free trade with no compedton pohicy  is shown
with U2 which is case 2.
Figure  B  shows  the  two  cases with
Figure B. Restricted Trade  restricted trade with and without competition
Fu  policies. Case 3 is one that has restricted trade
Ca2sCe  1  a  with competition policies. Case 4 is restrcted
Case c4)  trade with no competition  policies.
Given  the standard ssumpdons  of this
p 3,  8W-  model  it is possible to rank the order of
combinations  of trade and competiton  policies
UP  as 1 >  2>  3 > 4.  When  the  assumptions  do
not hold, due to increasing  rers  to scale and
. \-34  the presence of extraities,  this ranldng  could
change in less predictable ways.  In the first
instance  the ranldng  between  2 and  3 could  lead
to a reverse  order. That is when  protection  is
pursued  for strategic  trade  theory  purposes.  However,  this situation  is not viable  in the  presence
of less than altuistic public officials  who may be tempted  to extact their own rents so that
societal welfare is reduced.
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